Technological revolutions and waves of creative destruction are associated with new ventures and the destruction of mature firms, but also with the failure of numerous startups, suggesting a time of increased experimentation in the economy. We provide a model of investment into new ventures that demonstrates why some places, times and industries should be associated with a greater degree of experimentation by investors. Investors respond to increases in the forecasted probability of future funding by funding more innovative ideas. We propose that extremely novel technologies may need 'hot' financial markets to get through the initial period of discovery or diffusion.
My attitude is batten down the hatches...Any co without at least a year of cash minimum in the bank is in trouble... -Douglas Leone, a partner at Sequoia Captial in an email to his partner Michael Moritz, October 6th, 2008.
The amount of financing available for startups engaged in innovation is notoriously volatile. These "investment cycles" have been documented in the literature on venture capital (Gompers and Lerner (2004) , Kaplan and Schoar (2005) , Gompers et al. (2008) ), but have also been shown in historical work linking financial market activity to radical innovations in manufacturing, communications and transportation going back to the mid 1700s (Kindleberger (1978) ; Perez (2002) ).
Entrepreneurs and venture capital investors constantly worry about these fluxes in capital and refer to them as financing risk -the potential inability to find future funding for otherwise healthy firms. This worry seems rational given the great declines in venture investing in both 2001 and 2008, and to a lesser extent the ebbs and flows of capital that have occurred within different venture sectors at different times.
What impact does the shifting supply of capital have on innovation? We model the impact of financing risk on the decision to fund a new venture. In our model, rational investors react to a possible shock to the financial market. We demonstrate that increased financing risk changes the type of firm rational investors are willing to fund, by reducing the degree of experimentation investors are willing to undertake. Thus, financing risk alters both the amount and the type of investments that are made, but not in the manner expected by conventional wisdom.
Conventional wisdom and much of the popular literature tends to associate periods of low capital with fewer higher quality investments, while periods of abundant capital are thought to finance many lower quality firms (Gupta (2000) ). Indeed, theories about herding among investors (Scharfstein and Stein (1990) ), a fall in investor discipline, or the possibility of lower discount rates in hot markets are all consistent with the notion that projects funded in hot markets might be systematically worse than those funded in less active periods. In fact, many view the increased failure rates among investments made in boom times as prima facie evidence of lower quality investments. But note that increased experimentation would also be associated with increased failure, and what looks like a poor investment ex-post may have been very experimental ex-ante.
Greater experimentation ex-ante implies that boom times would be associated with increased failure rates, but not because the projects were worse, rather because they were more experimental. Therefore, simultaneously we would expect to see a few great successes. This matches the findings in Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2012) who report that that projects funded in boom times are more likely to fail but conditional on success create more value, patent more and receive more patent cites.
This increase in investors willingness to experiment may be a central part of the technological revolutions that drive the process of creative destruction (Schumpeter (1942) ; Aghion and Howitt (1992) ). Much of the existing literature on the process of creative destruction has focused on the successes of breakthrough technologies at the expense of established firms, while there is little emphasis on tying together the fact that the ultimate success of a few firms commercializing radical innovations comes hand-in-hand with a vast number of failures among other new ventures (Klepper and Graddy (1990) ; Kerr and Nanda (2009) ). That is, technological revolutions seem to be associated with periods of greater experimentation, with a few successful new ventures and a large number of failures among startups, not just failures of existing firms. We demonstrates how financial markets can create this outcome -hot markets facilitate the experimentation that is important for the commercialization and diffusion of radical new technologies.
A growing body of work considers the role of finance in the innovation process (see Black and Gilson (1998) , Kortum and Lerner (2000) , Hellmann (2002) , Sorensen (2007) , Lerner, Sorensen and Stromberg (2011), Tian and Wang (2011) , Manso (2011) , Hellmann and Puri (2000) ). We add to this line of research by directly considering the cycles of capital availability and their impact on innovation due to the rational response of investors.
Our results suggest that the experimentation by investors is a key channel through which the financial markets may impact real outcomes. Rather than just reducing frictions in the availability of capital for new ventures, investment cycles may play a much more central role in the diffusion and commercialization of technologies in the economy. 1
Financial market investment cycles may create innovation cycles. Hence the extent of 1 Prior work examining the link between financial markets and innovation suggests that the ebbs and flows of financing follow from the variation in innovation -money flows toward good ideas and away from bad, although possibly with some friction or behavioral effect. Financial markets are thought to play a role to the extent that reducing frictions allows capital to flow more freely and improves economic growth (Levine and Zervos (1998) ). Even work that focuses more directly on financial markets tends to explain pricing "bubbles", taking innovation and commercialization as a given and exogenous event (Pastor and Veronesi (2009) , Gompers et al. (2008) , Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) ). In this thinking, financing effects follow the underlying invention.
commercialization of new ideas in a given industry, place, or time may depend crucially on the state of the financial market. This is a different way to think about the degree and timing of innovation, and leads to a number of new insights and empirical predictions relating to the link between financial markets and the commercialization of innovation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I provides the intuition behind the results and the relation to different literatures. Section II outlines a simple model of investing with financing risk. Section III considers the investor response to financing risk and shows why why the most innovative projects in the economy are most impacted by financing risk. Section IV summarizes the key implications and extensions of our model and Section V concludes.
I. The Idea
The intuition behind financing risk is as follows: when a project requires multiple periods of investment that are cumulatively more than any individual investor has (or is willing to allocate), current investors need to rely on future investors to fund the project to cash flow positive and realize the benefits of their investment. However, investors may forecast limited funding availability in the next period. 2 This potential lack of future funding, could impact the firm today. If a shock occurs to the forecast of future funding, a firm that is not cash flow positive will have lower bargaining power in the event of an exit because their outside options will have changed. Alternatively, employees may leave or spend effort looking for another job or simply work less hard, or customers who need support may delay purchasing, etc. Thus, a forecast of limited funding may lower the NPV of a project and make it rational to believe it will not get funding.
We show that the investor response to a potential capital shock counters its effect for some firms. Investors who perceive the possibility of financing risk can reduce or eliminate its impact by providing more funding up front (or commit more). Thus, for many projects there is no equilibrium impact of financing risk.
However, experimental projects are still impacted by financing risk in equilibrium. This occurs because an important attribute of experimental new ventures is that their outcomes are highly uncertain. 3 A natural consequence of this uncertainty is that investors in such firms want to stage their investments, provide limited capital to the firm in each round, and learn more about the firm's potential at each stage in order to preserve the option to terminate their investments before providing more financing (see Gompers (1995) , Bergemann and Hege (2005) , Bergemann, Hege and Peng (2008) ).
The presence of financing risk therefore creates a trade-off for investors between providing more capital and providing less. Investors can reduce the impact of a shock to the funding forecast by giving a firm more money upfront (or committing to fund), but this comes at a cost in the loss of option value. Investors who give a firm less money can learn more before deciding to invest more. As noted by Gompers (1995) , Bergemann and Hege (2005) , and Bergemann, Hege and Peng (2008) , the cost of the lost real option is much more important for more experimental projects where outcomes are uncertain and the real option to shut down or invest more is most valuable. In equilibrium, financing risk therefore has the greatest impact on the most experimental projects because they have the most real option value and cannot be given a lot of money up front. 4 A key contribution of our paper is, therefore, to show how some projects (those more experimental in nature) are impacted more by financing risk even in a financial market with unlimited capital and all rational equally informed participants. The inability to contract across time creates a market failure for firms that require sequential funding.
By modeling the investor response to financing risk we are able to understand why financing risk is likely to create or magnify innovative activity, as well as lead investors to fund a different type of firm at different times in the innovation cycle. Conventional wisdom on the effect of abundant financing is one of money chasing deals (Gompers and Lerner (2000) ) -that when more money enters an area more "bad", lower return, deals are funded. Our idea is that simultaneously money changes deals. That is, when capital is abundant, more innovative ideas are funded because financing risk falls in these times, increasing the NPV of innovative projects. Thus, during peaks of activity financiers may increase experimentation and fund a fundamentally different type of activity.
The model of investment with financing risk leads directly to a number of empirical predictions, the first of which is simply that financing risk should create variation in the funding of innovative new ventures. The literature on venture capital has documented the extreme variation in venture capital investment (Gompers and Lerner (2004) ) and fundraising (Gompers and Lerner (1998) ), that are correlated with high market values, hot IPO markets or past returns (Kaplan and Schoar (2005) ). Furthermore, technological revolutions seem to be associated with 'hot' financial markets (Perez (2002) ). Prior work has suggested that these correlations could be overreaction by investors (Gompers and Lerner (1998) ), rational reactions to fundamentals (Gompers et al. (2008) , Pastor and Veronesi (2009) ), herd behavior for reputational concerns (Scharfstein and Stein (1990) ) or even reverse causality (Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) ). Our model suggests that at least part of the link between innovation and periods of hot financial markets is because low financing risk leads investors to fund experimentation and hence discover and commercialize the most innovative ideas in the economy.
While the above prediction of our model is similar to other explanations linking financial markets to innovation, other predictions are not. For example, an empirical implication of our model is that the mix of investors should change in periods of abundant capital, relative to periods of low capital. Early round investors of very innovative projects are impacted to a greater extent by financing risk as the option value at a projects earliest stages is higher. Thus, early stage investing activity should be particularly impacted by hot and cold financial markets. Our model also predicts that the mix of investors should shift towards investors with less capital to deploy (such as so called 'Angel' investors) in good times when financing risk is low, as the smaller and more frequent investments in periods of low financing risk are particularly well suited to smaller investors. Many other predictions arise from our model, and while anecdotal evidence of these impacts is abundant our work suggests a much more through empirical examination is needed.
Another implication of accounting for financing risk and the investor response is that any given investor should not rush to invest into all projects in a sector that is out of favor.
Conventional wisdom (and most past work) suggests that when money leaves a sector it is a good time to invest, and when a lot of money enters it is just the time to leave. This intuition arises because the flood of money lowers the discipline of external finance and allows lower quality projects to get capital (Gompers and Lerner (2000) ; Nanda (2008) ).
However, accounting for financing risk makes it clear that investors cannot rush to invest into all projects in a sector that is out of favor. In particular, innovative projects have a low probability of receiving future funding and become NPV negative once financing risk is taken into account. This provides a rational explanation for why investors stay out of 'cold' markets.
Our model also implies that some extremely novel but NPV positive technologies or projects may in fact need 'hot' financial markets to get through the initial period of discovery or diffusion, because otherwise the financing risk for them is too extreme. This provides a more positive interpretation to peaks of financial activity and may also explain the historical link between the initial diffusion of many novel technologies (e.g. canals, railways, telephones, motor cars, internet, clean technology) being associated with heated financial market activity (Perez (2002) ).This implies that regulators should not always be concerned with popping 'bubbles', and furthermore, that those wishing to stimulate innovation should look for ways to concentrate investment in a sector or time or location in order to help create the coordination among investors that creates or magnifies innovation.
A final notable implication of our model relates to direct measures of innovation such as patenting that occur in great waves of activity (see Griliches (1990) ). There are many explanations for why innovative output might cluster in certain periods of time even though we expect ideas to occur at random. The classical explanations focus on sudden breakthroughs that lead to a cascade of follow-on inventions (e.g. Schumpeter (1939); Kuznets (1940) ; Kleinknecht (1987) ; Stein (1997)) or on changes in sales and profitability (or potential profitability) that stimulate investment in R&D and then drive concentrated periods of innovation (e.g. Schmookler (1966) ). 5 While these traditional explanations clearly have merit, combining our model of financing risk with the direct evidence on the link between financial market activity and innovation (Kortum and Lerner (2000) , Mollica and Zingales (2007) , Samila and Sorenson (2011) ) suggests that financial markets may play a much larger and under-studied role in the creation and magnification of innovation waves in the real economy. Financial market activity may drive concentration in the commercialization of innovation, even if the inventions occurred at random. 6
Our work is also related to the literature on multiple equilibria (see Diamond (1982) , Cooper and John (1988) , Chatterjee, Cooper and Ravikumar (1993) ) and the big push literature (see Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) , and a review by Matsuyama (1995) ).
In this work and in Shleifer (1986) , positive externalities between investments create the possibility of both a low and a high equilibrium that depends on the self-fulfilling expectations of investors. However, in our paper there are no externalities between investments and instead it is the required coordination between investors across time on the same investment that creates the possibility that an exogenous shock to financial markets can cause rational investors to stop investing. In our work, nothing fundamental (externalities, novel inventions, investor risk aversion, information asymmetries, etc) is required to create financing risk and furthermore, the most innovative firms cannot be protected from financing risk. Thus, financing risk has an inevitable impact on the financing of new ventures.
II. A Model of Investment
The central goal of our model is to delineate the equilibrium impact of financing risk on investment decisions. Financing risk is the risk that future investors will not fund a firm at its next stage even if the NPV of the project, if fully funded, has not changed, leading a viable firm with good fundamentals to go bankrupt. We emphasize that financing risk is part of a rational equilibrium and show why innovative projects are particularly susceptible to financing risk.
Note that in the initial formulation of the model all projects will be impacted by financing risk. This is because we have not yet endogenized the investor response. In later sections when we endogenize the response to the potential of financing risk we will see that the investor response can eliminate the impact of financing risk for the less experimental projects.
6 Our ideas have some similarities to Shleifer (1986) . In Shleifer's theory, inventions arrive randomly but are implemented simultaneously due to commonly shared expectations about the best time to bring out a new invention. This idea relies on a cautious and patient inventor who might wait years to unveil a new idea -a potentially difficult idea to square with entrepreneurial passions. In our paper we also suggest that the expectations of the actions of others matter but it is the cautious financier rather than then inventor who waits for the right time to fund the research or commercialization around new inventions. The rational financier with limited resources funds a project only when he rationally forecasts a high enough probability that a future investor will support the project. A large enough shock to the investors forecast of future funding availability causes the investor to not invest today.
A. Setup
We model a single early stage firm inside a broader economy. By early stage we aim to capture the idea that the firm does not have the cash flows to be self sufficient and hence requires outside investment to survive. A second aspect of early stage firms is that investment in an early stage firm may produce positive results, negative results or inconclusive results, so more money may be needed to learn if the project is viable. For example, a new biotech firm may do initial studies to determine how well a compound works in mice. Then, depending on the results, money may be spent to start primate trials, the project may be shut down, or more studies on mice may be needed.
Consider a firm that must get over hurdles in order to reach its potential expected payoff, V, which one can think of as the exit point for investors. These hurdles could represent several rounds of technological uncertainty, or customer adoption risk, or scaling issues, etc. For simplicity we will examine a firm with just a single hurdle as this is enough to demonstrate the relevant issues. 7 By spending x the firm can attempt to get over the hurdle. We will refer to the NPV of a firm before it crosses the hurdle as Π t , where the t subscript indicates the period. With a probability γ f the results are negative and the project fails, where the f subscript represents failure. Failure means that some information is learned about the firm that makes any new investment negative NPV regardless of the financing environment. It might be the case that its technology does not work, its new processes is not cost effective or estimates of the target market are smaller than initially hoped, etc. With probability γ s the firm succeeds and generates a value V, where the s represents success. And with probability 1 − γ f − γ s the project needs more money to attempt to get over the hurdle. In this case spending $x again gives the firm another attempt to get over the hurdle.
At each point in time the possibility that the firm needs more money means that, in theory, a firm could continue for a nearly infinite number of periods. However, we would never expect to actually see this in the data. For example a firm with a 33% chance of needing more money each period would only have an 11% chance of neither making it over the hurdle or failing after two periods and only a 0.4% chance after 5 periods. Thus, investors might occasionally see a firm struggle on, never quite making it and never quite failing for 5 or even 10 periods/years. However, this would be extremely rare and anything much longer would essentially never occur. The notion that it may always be possible to try for one more period captures the idea that while at the start of a project investors can be confident that the project will yield a positive or negative result within about 7 years, they can never be sure how much money the project will require. Thus, conditional on a firm making it 7 years without failing or succeeding investors cannot be sure how much more investment will be needed to get an answer one way or the other.
We model the decision of investors willing to invest in early stage firms, which we call venture capitalists (VCs) although this is just short hand for all private investors. 8, 9 In each period, perfectly competitive VCs choose whether or not to invest the x to support the firm through the next period. Firms that do not receive capital go bankrupt. For simplicity, we assume that firms that go bankrupt are worth nothing. Initially we will consider VCs who can fund the firm for only one period, and later we consider larger investments. 10 However, capital is never scarce in the model. Although each individual VC is capital constrained, we assume that there are enough VCs so that all positive NPV projects get done. Therefore, the entrepreneur captures any expected rent from the firm.
These assumptions maximize the chance that the VC will invest as we want to make sure our results do not arise from any aggregate capital constraints.
VCs require an expected rate of return of, r. 11 VCs are rational and use a positive NPV rule for investing and they expect other VCs to also rationally use a positive NPV rule. Since VCs compete away all rents leaving the entrepreneur with any positive NPV, a VC investing in period 1 gets a fraction x/(Π 1 + x) of the firm. 12 This fraction is then diluted down in the next period as the next investor gets a fraction of x/(Π 2 + x), so the first investor retains the fraction x/(Π 1 + x) * (1 − x/(Π 2 + x)). Of course, the present discounted value of the VCs' fractions in each future period times the expected payoff in each future period exactly equal x. 13 This ensures that the firm will get an investment as long as the firm is not NPV negative. Therefore, as we proceed, in order to determine if the VC will invest we will simply need to determine if the firm is not NPV negative. To ensure that none of our results are driven by illiquidity we assume that the firm can be sold for its NPV at any time.
B. Forecasts
We assume that there is an exogenous shock to the forecast of future funding availability.
We will delineate the shock with I ∈ [0, 1] where I = 1 is the 'Invest' state and I = 0 is the 'No-Invest' state and the shock is a shift between states. Examples of such shocks might relate to an increase in general uncertainty, or to a key invention in a sector, a change in future industry growth expectations, a government proposal to improve technology in an area, etc. We might think of these shocks as relating to an industry or area of investing such as bio-tech, green-tech, or high-tech but they could also occur at a more or less granular level.
This shock could reduce the value of the company today if, for example, nervous employees reduced effort or looked for other jobs, or customer's delayed purchases, or bargaining power in a potential acquisition was reduced, or other channels. In the model presented in the main part of the paper we do not model the underlying process of how financing risk affects the firm value today. Instead, for simplicity, we assume that the firm payoff if successful, V, depends on the future financing environment, i.e. V (I), where V (1) > V (0).
In an online appendix we fully model how equilibrium negotiations in an acquisition could be impacted by a poor financing environment.
Given the effect of financing risk on firm value we hypothesize (and later confirm) that there are at least two symmetric pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria -one in which VCs choose to fund a viable project and one in which they do not. 14 We assume 13 For example consider a simple firm that requires an investment of $1 but pays $4 with a 50% probability or zero. If it pays zero then another $1 investment will pay $4 with a 50% probability and with a 50% probability the firm ends. The NPV of the firm, Y = 0.5 * 4 + 0.5 * (0.5 * 4 − 1) − 1 = 2 + 0.5 − 1 = $1.50, is captured by the entrepreneur. Therefore, the VC who invests the first $1 gets 1/(Y + 1) = 1/2.5 = 2/5. The NPV of the second investment $1 is Z = 0.5 * 4 − 1 = $1, so the VC who invests the second $1 gets 1/(Z + 1) = 1/2 of the firm. If the second investment occurs, then the first VC who originally owned 2/5 th of the company gets diluted down to 1/5 th . Thus the first VC gets an expected payoff of 0.5 * 4(2/5) + 0.5 * 0.5 * 4(1/5) = 0.80 + .20 = $1 which is exactly what he invested. Therefore, the investment including expected dilution is NPV zero for the VCs. This ensures a VC will invest as long as the firm has NPV ≥ 0, i.e., the fraction x/(N P V + x) is less than or equal to 1.
14 This is not a perfect Bayesian equilibrium or a sequential equilibrium because no information is hidden so that an exogenous shock to markets determines which equilibrium results. 15 For example, Bloom (2009) shows how shocks to uncertainty cause firms to temporarily pause their investing activity. What is interesting about our work is that we show how investors in different types of projects respond to and prepare for these potential shocks.
Since investors have only enough money to support the firm for one (or limited) periods, investors deciding whether or not to invest must determine whether or not they believe other investors will continue to support the firm in the future. Since all investors are rational and all investors know that other investors are rational it would seem that the need to forecast the actions of others would not matter. But we will see that this is not the case.
In our model the shock, and thus the state of the world, has an exogenous transition probability and we assume the shock follows a Markov chain. θ is the probability that industry or sector stays in the invest state, and (1 − θ) is the probability that an industry or sector shifts from the Invest to the No-Invest state. φ is the probability that an industry transitions back to the Invest state, and (1 − φ) is the probability that an industry in the No-Invest state stays in that state. We assume that states are more likely to persist than transition, i.e., θ and φ are both greater than both (1−θ) and (1−φ). Thus, the transition matrix for the shock I is I = 1
We model the transition probability as exogenous because we are interested in the response of investors to the possibility of financing risk rather than in the causes for the potential equilibria switch. 16 Note that for an equilibrium to be rational all forecasts must be correct in expectation.
nothing is learned from off equilibrium path actions. An investor who sees a negative NPV investment made does not alter his belief in the probability of future investment because VCs are assumed equally informed and each VC is small enough that their effect of the aggregate probability of funding is negligible. Equilibria are thus invariant to small fluctuations in the behavior of any one player. 15 This is similar to the "sunspot equilibria", see Chatterjee, Cooper and Ravikumar (1993) 16 The global games literature started by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) , and used in interesting papers such as Morris and Shin (1998) and Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) allows the user to create and alter parameters that affect which of multiple equilibria holds. It is useful for demonstrating theories about when and why the equilibrium may jump. We take the shock to be exogenous because we are interested in looking at the investors response given the jump rather than focusing on the reasons for the jump (although this is an interesting direction for future research).
I is the signal and thus it also represents the forecast of the VCs. When I = 1 the forecast is that the next round VC will invest, and when I = 0 the next round VC is forecasted not to invest. 17 Since all VCs are rational they will invest if the expected NPV of the project is positive. Let Π t I=1 represent the NPV of the project when the forecast is 'invest' and let Π t I=0 represent the NPV of the project when the forecast is for 'no-investment'. Recall that for now each VC only has enough money to support the project for one period and we are not yet allowing them to pool together or increase their investment in response to the potential financing risk.
The extensive form of the game is shown in figure 1. Conditional on a rational forecast of the VCs' actions in the future, each investor maximizes their wealth, and the NPV of the project in period t can be written as
where
The above equation demonstrates the effect on the current NPV of the forecast of the 17 We will see that when this forecast is accurate the forecast will also determine whether or not VCs will invest today so I = 1 or 0 will also represent the current 'state' of the world in equilibrium.
VC. Comparing equation (2) when I = 1 to the same equation when I = 0 we see that the NPV when the project is expected not to get funding is impacted in two ways. First, the project has a lower chance of accruing value from all future investments because Π t+1 I=1 is now multiplied by (1 − φ) which is less than θ. And second, the probability of getting the higher value if successful drops.
Note that this equation assumes that if the shock occurs and investors enter the 'NoInvest' state then no further investment will occur as long as that state continues. This must be confirmed in equilibrium. If it is not true then Z in the NPV equation becomes 1 and V (0) becomes V (1), as though the state is always in the invest equilibrium and the shock does not affect the firm.
Exploiting the stationarity in the model we can solve for equilibrium NPV
This leads directly to our understanding that the shock can result in a funding failure for some firms.
PROPOSITION 1: There are some firms {V (I), x, γ s , γ f , r} whose funding does not depend on the shock (they either always get funding or never do). However, as long as φ and θ are large enough, there are some firms (those such that V (0) < x(1+r) γs < V (1)) for which the shock to the forecast of future availability of financing results in the withdrawal of financing today. That is, there are two symmetric pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria -one in which the VCs invest (when they forecast other VCs will invest) and another in which VCs do not invest (when they forecast other VCs will not invest).
PROOF:
See Appendix A.A2
It is only rational for a VC to forecast that a future VC will invest if it is an NPV positive investment, Π I=1 ≥ 0. On the other hand, it is only rational to forecast other VCs will not invest if Π I=0 < 0. Therefore, for the shock to have impact it must be the case simultaneously that Π I=1 ≥ 0 and Π I=0 ≤ 0. Thus, a firm that is 'good enough' (high enough V (1) and V (0)) will get funded no matter whether the shock occurs and a forecast of no funding is not rational. For other 'weak' firms the firm never receives funding as it is always NPV negative. But there are some firms where the shock is important because when future funding is not expected the firm NPV drops from positive to negative. For these firms, φ must be large enough such that the shock does not end so quickly that it is always NPV positive to keep investing through it. If it is then firms are not affected by the shock.
For the shock to be important, the NPV of the project today must change from positive to negative NPV depending on whether or not the project is expected to get funding tomorrow. This is not as straight forward as it sounds. For example, if the 'project' is simply a series of NPV positive coin flips then failing to get funding tomorrow will reduce the total NPV of the project, however, it will still be positive NPV. Thus, the investor today should still pay to see the coin flipped, and so should the investor tomorrow thus making the forecast of no future financing incorrect. The only way for a 'no-invest' forecast to be correct is if the forecast fundamentally alters today's payoffs. Appendix A demonstrates why a model in which investors simply forecast the potential not to receive funding and thus lose the future project payoffs cannot rationally contain financing risk. In equilibrium different types of projects are impacted by financing risk in different ways. Figure 2 shows how the NPV of different projects changes as financing risk, (1 − θ), gets larger. Project 1 is unaffected by financing risk because it is so high quality that it can get funded even after a shock. Projects 3 and 4 become less valuable as financing risk increases, with project 4 actually becoming NPV negative if financing risk is high enough.
Project 2 is interesting because for low levels of financing risk it is unaffected by the shock but eventually for high enough financing risk (i.e. high enough probability of a shock) its value falls to the point where it will not get funding in the bad state and so its NPV falls and continues to decrease with greater financing risk. It is instructive to understand why the equilibrium NPV for project 2 jumps down. Figure 3 shows why. Remember that in equilibrium financing risk is only rational if the forecast that investors will not invest in the bad state is rational. It is only rational for investors to not invest in the bad state if the project is NPV negative in that state. In Figure 3 the lowest line (large dashes) is the NPV of investing when the forecast is for no future funding (I = 0). However, for low enough financing risk the NPV is actually positive even when the investor believes (wrongly) that future funding is unlikely. In fact, since the NPV is positive whether or not the investor believes future investors will invest, the current investor should invest regardless of the signal and so will future investors.
Thus, Project 2, is initially unaffected by financing risk. Eventually, however, the forecast that future investors will not invest if I = 0 becomes correct and the NPV, even in the good state, is impact by the possibility of a future jump to the bad state, i.e., it is impacted by financing risk.
Overall, any project with a downward sloping NPV line will get funding in the good state and not get funding in the bad state. Thus, many projects are less valuable with greater financing risk and there are many projects that will only get funding in the good state.
We have presented the equilibrium with financing risk but no exante preparation for the potential shock. In the next section, we examine what happens if everyone expects both a possible shock as well as a subsequent shock back to the high funding state. Then we consider the equilibrium investor response to the threat of financing risk.
The reader may wonder at this point how our model applies to experimental firmsas of now financing risk seems to apply to all projects. This is because we have not yet endogenized the investor response to financing risk. When we allow investors to provide more money we will see that they will do so in equilibrium for the less experimental firms and eliminate financing risk. These additional ideas allow us to establish that financing risk is more important for experimental projects.
III. Investor response to financing risk.
Given financing risk, we must ask how investors respond to the potential risk. Their response will eliminate the impact of the shock for some investments and show why we should expect financing risk to be a more important phenomenon for more experimental firms.
If the reliance on other investors is what leads to the problem, the question arises as to whether a VC with more money or a syndicate of VCs can overcome the No-Invest equilibrium. We consider this first. Then we include the possibility that investors can write complete contracts that cover future financing needs. This demonstrates the optimal response in a perfect world. Then, we consider a more realistic world in which contracts are incomplete. It is this set up that demonstrates the trade-offs faced by investors attempting to fund experimental projects.
A. Can a wealthier investor protect their investment from a shock?
Consider a VC who has enough capital to fund the investment for two periods. One might imagine that this VC is less impacted by financing risk in the first period they invest because they can be sure to invest in the next period. In this case one might think that if the shock occurs the expected value of the firm in the first period is
where the n = 2 superscript signifies that the firm has two periods of funding. This NPV is equation (2) with I = 0 but a guaranteed extra round of investment in spite of the No-Invest forecast (because of the second $x held by the VC). This would suggest both that the investor gets Π t+1 I=0 (which is negative) instead of zero because of the extra funding, and that firm value is improved from as there is no longer a chance of getting V (0) after the first investment. If this were correct, then the NPV in period t might be greater for a VC with enough funding for two periods.
However, equation (4) demonstrates the fallacy of this argument. In equation (4) the extra x is assumed to be invested even though the forecast is still that no other investors will invest. However, when the VC with two x gets to the second period she will only have one x. At that point, if she invests, she knows that no other investor is forecasted to invest in the project. Therefore, she gets Π t+1 I=0 by investing. However, the No-Invest equilibrium is only rational if Π t+1 I=0 < 0. Therefore, the VC will not invest her second
x because it is an NPV negative investment.
Of course, using backward induction, the VC will realize that she will not invest the second x and therefore, will reevaluate her decision to invest the first x. Since the second x will only be invested in the Invest equilibrium, the decision to invest the first x is the same for VCs with either x or 2x.
This same logic applies even if we consider the possibility that a VC has more than 2x.
To see this, note that the very last x that the VC has will only be spent if the subsequent 'good' shock has occurred. The VC knows this in the period before the last period and also knows that if the 'good' shock has not occurred in the period just before this last period, then 1−φ is not large enough to make investing the second to last x a good idea (if it were large enough, it would cause VCs to behave as if the state occurs today and hence have caused them to not be impacted by the initial shock). Therefore, in the period just before this last period, the VC understands that the last x will only be spent if the 'good' shock occurs. So the second to last x is not invested either. Continuing this backward induction eventually brings us back to the first x.
This backward induction tells us that (in the absence of commitment) only an investor
with an amount of capital X = x r can prevent the shock from impacting the firm NPV. This suggests that only very large firms with cash generating assets greater than X will not face financing risk. 18 Empirically, this implies that the variation in innovation inside large firms who generate internal cash for R&D should be much more stable across time than aggregate innovation produced by startup firms. Furthermore, among venture capitalists, the largest funds that can potentially support a project to fruition without other future investors, are also less impacted by financing risk. This conveys a strong advantage to the largest funds that is most valuable and apparent in bad financing environments. Both of these predictions would be interesting to look for in the data.
In the absence of commitment, until an investor or a syndicate has more than x/r (that can generate x per period) more money will not prevent the firm from facing financing risk. This is because future unrelated investors are already acting rationally so unless the investors can commit to an irrational action in the future, they will act no differently from the market. However, we will see the importance of commitment in the next section.
B. The Benefits and Costs of Commitment
Increasing the dollars held by one investor or forming a syndicate does not protect the company from the shock because in each period the investment decision is made rationally and so a syndicate or even one investor with more money makes no decision differently than the market (until they have enough money that they never need the market again).
After all, sunk costs are sunk. Therefore, if the market is rationally not investing, then any investor would make the same decision as the market.
However, we show that commitment to invest through a shock can change this result.
We now allow an investor to commit to invest in the next period regardless of whether the shock has occurred.
Initially we will assume that contracts are complete and that there are no information asymmetries -so that the investor who has committed to invest in the second period does not invest if the project turns unviable (probability γ f ), but will invest if the project is viable and the shock has occurred. Alternatively, an equivalent contract is a state contingent contract where investors give a project 2x or more in a period and the project commits to return any unused funds if the project becomes unviable but not if shock occurs.
Commitment trades off the potential increase in firm value with the potential loss from having to invest after the shock. If an investor only invests a single x then we know from above that the expected project NPV is equation (2). If instead an investor or syndicate commits to invest in both the first and the second period then we will refer to the project NPV as Π t n=2 I where the n = 2 indicates two periods of commitment (one can think of all the NPVs above as having an implicit n = 1, although from here forward we will explicitly indicate the number of periods of commitment). The extra period of commitment ensures that the project will receive an investment in the next period even if the shock has occurred, I = 0. This, in turn, alters the bargaining outcome of any sale, encourages buyers to purchase, etc so value of the firm increases. Therefore, the NPV when an investor commits to fund a project for two periods is < 0.
Thus, the question of whether it is better to commit to a second round of investment is a question of whether profits with commitment are bigger than profits without. Subtracting the two profit equations, the question is reduced to whether Π t n=2 I
where < 0).
The following proposition shows the impact of this trade-off.
PROPOSITION 2: If investors or syndicates can commit to invest in future periods and contracts are complete then for any project {V (I), x, γ s , γ f , r} which is impacted by financing risk, committing enough money increases the project NPV and eliminates the impact of the shock, i.e. the project is no longer impacted by financing risk.
PROOF:
See Appendix A.A3
By committing to a third period of investment the investor essentially 'puts off' potentially having to make the negative NPV investment by one period. Simultaneously committing more improves the projects value (by, for example, improving its bargaining power) for all periods of commitment. Thus, eventually by committing to fund the project for enough periods the bargaining improvement outweighs the ever more unlikely negative NPV investment. The negative NPV investment becomes less and less likely because a firm with more money is more likely to succeed or fail before it runs out of money -and it is only when the project has little money that it becomes negative NPV.
Therefore, large investors and syndicates can actually increase the NPV of the projects they fund by giving them more dollars or implicitly or explicitly committing to fund them for longer. Enough committed dollars make the project NPV positive even if financing risk is high. For these projects, the only equilibrium is the Invest equilibrium and commitment eliminates the impact financing risk.
The logic above would seem to suggest that all projects should get significant up front funding. However, as noted above, we have so far assumed that an investor or syndicate that commits to fund a project can withdraw funding if the project becomes unviable, i.e.
the commitment only relates to the state of the world and not to the project quality.
The analogous venture capital contract is a tranched investment, in which the investors have committed to fund a project if certain milestones are reached. These type of contracts provide the investor with a real option, but we believe they are also an attempt to overcome financing risk as they commit the investor to invest if the company has done well even if the world has done poorly. However, they rarely cover more than one future financing, and for many projects (particularly innovative ones), it is very difficult to articulate and delineate a clear milestone. Thus, it is unrealistic to assume that complete state-contingent contracts can be written for all future funding dates at the start of a project. The next section explores the trade-offs under the more realistic scenario of incomplete contracts.
C. Incomplete Contracts and the Lost Real Option
This section explains why this paper is ultimately about experimenting/innovative/high real option firms. In a realistic setting with incomplete contracts across time we will see a fundamental tradeoff in the amount of money provided to innovative firms that leaves them impacted by financing risk in equilibrium.
Complete contracts are unrealistic as investors cannot contract on every future funding need at the start of a project. In this section, we assume that contracts are incomplete (a la Grossman and Hart (1986) ; Hart and Moore (1990) ). We assume that it is not possible to either write down or verify all future states in which funding should or should not occur.
For example, it might be the case that states of nature are observable by the investors but not verifiable by a court. Specifically we define an incomplete contract as follows.
DEFINITION 1:
In an incomplete contract, investors cannot contract on actions that differ between a shock to markets, I = 0 and a project becoming unviable, (which happens with probability γ f ).
We continue to assume commitment is enforceable, as in the last section, but now, without complete contracts, investors are not able to write contracts that release them (or return unused capital) when bad firm specific information arrives. We further add the assumption that entrepreneurs have a private benefit of control and thus benefit from continuing the firm. 19 Therefore, without a contract that requires the entrepreneur to shut down given bad information the project will continue until it is out of money. This is essentially the assumption that an entrepreneur with more money will spend more and at least some of it in a wasteful manner. 20
If the money given to a firm will be spent, then giving more money to a firm destroys some of the value of the firm's real option to shut down in the event that intermediate information is not positive. On the other hand, more money better protects the firm 19 It is not hard to believe that since it is not their money, entrepreneurs/employees might like to continue past when investors would like to shut down. 20 The main tradeoff is the same if only a fraction of the committed money would be spent after the arrival of bad news.
from the negative shock. Thus, it is those firms with more valuable real options for which protection from financing risk is more costly.
In our model the real option value in a firm depends on the probability that a firm loses viability before it is sold. If γ f = 0 the firm is always viable and there is no real option value in shutting the firm down (as it never needs to be shut down). However, for higher values of γ f it becomes valuable to give the firm less up front funding (smaller commitment) and wait to learn that it is still a viable firm in the next period. So holding the NPV of a firm constant, a firm with a greater γ f has more option value, i.e., it is more valuable to be able to abandon the project.
Thus, a firm with greater γ f is more 'experimental' in that it is more valuable to run this firm by trying things and waiting to see the outcome. We think that generally more innovative projects require a greater need to test or experiment before proceeding, as well as more early stage firms. Thus, we are demonstrating the effect of financing risk on investors willingness to financing innovative firms, which is likely to impact the most innovative firms.
We can see the effect of incomplete contracts and real options on the profitability of committing extra dollars to a firm. In section III, when we assumed complete contracts, the profit from committing to invest an extra x was equation (5). With complete contracts if the project lost viability the investor would not lose the second committed x. Now, however, committing 2x requires the investor to lose the second x if the project fails (i.e., it will be spent by the entrepreneur). Thus, the expected profit from committing 2x
The difference between the profit function with complete contracts equation (5) and without is the option value of potentially abandoning the project after one period instead of funding it for two. This equals γ f 1+r x. Another way to say this is that it is the additional cost to commitment when the money will be spent even if the firm fails. This leads directly to our next proposition PROPOSITION 3: Incomplete contracts reduce the value of committing more money and the reduction in value is larger for more experimental firms (firms with more real option value).
PROOF:
See Appendix A.A4
The central insight comes from comparing the profit equations with and without complete contracts. Note that if γ f = 0 there is no real option value and no difference between the profit functions. 21 However, with incomplete contracts, holding the NPV constant, the larger γ f becomes the more valuable it becomes to give the project only one period of funding to see if it fails. Thus, commitment becomes more and more costly. Investors who give a firm enough funding to fully protect it from the shock lose the option to give the firm a little funding and wait to see how it performs to give it more. Therefore, it is more costly to protect experimental projects with high real option value from the shock.
The less experimental firms can be given a larger amount of up-front financing in order to prevent the shock from affecting them. But the experimental firms cannot be given significant funding up front or the loss of the real options may change it to an NPV negative project. Therefore, more experimental firms should receive less funding up front and are more exposed to financing risk. As long as we generally think more experimental firms are more innovative, this should directly effect innovation.
For example, compare the funding of a coal power plant to a novel bio-fuel power plant.
The established coal technology needs no experimentation and can be built at scale. The financing for a project like this can be committed at the start and so it is unaffected by future financial market conditions. However, a new bio-fuel refinery where the yields are unproven requires pilot tests and demonstration plants before being adopted at scale. In a perfect world, complete contracts could allow investors to commit to fund the full-scale project at the early stages of innovation. However, to the extent that this is not possible the project will be forced to raise funding at each stage -exposing it to the market shocks.
Investors may try to form a large syndicate or provide more substantial upfront funding, 21 With γ f = 0 there is no chance the project will fail so commitment only effects the No-Invest state of the world. Thus, when γ f = 0 then just like in the last section, commitment trades off the cost of investing during the No-Invest equilibrium with the potential increase is sale price from doing so. But committing enough money always eliminates the No-Invest equilibrium. but they will find it NPV negative to commit to fund the entire project ex-ante. Thus, the more a project has a wait-and-learn-more aspect to it the more it will face a trade-off between maximizing real option value and defending against financing risk.
We specifically model the option to abandon the project. However, our ideas and results relate to all types of real options, like an expansion option, where it is optimal to wait to provide more money. Any delay in fully funding all the potential project needs exposes the firm to financing risk and creates a trade-off between protecting against financing risk and maximizing real option value.
Thus, in a world with incomplete contracts, less innovative firms are not hurt as much by the prospect of financing risk. Instead it is the innovative end of the economy that is most impacted by waves of investor interest and disinterest in the sector. This does not require any behavioral explanation, although the effect could certainly be magnified by behavioral considerations. Rational investors know they face financing risk. They rationally try to mitigate that risk by forming syndicates and providing larger sums of money up-front. But for more innovative firms providing more money reduces the option value of the investment. Thus, innovative projects must be left exposed to the whims of the financial market.
IV. Implications

A. Innovation, Project Mix and Financing Risk
A key implication of our model is that we should see high and low levels of innovative activity that are driven by shocks in the capital markets.
Investors attempt to protect their firm from the effect of a financial market shock by committing more money to a firm up front, but the more innovative the firm the more likely early failure may occur and the more costly it is to commit significant money up front.
Any increase in financing risk 22 lowers the NPV of all firms that that are impacted by financing risk. If this occurs some firms will become NPV negative with their current level of commitment. At which point some of these firms will be unable to get funding while other firms may find it value enhancing to raise more money and thereby reduce the value of some of their real options but defend better against the potential shock. Consider projects 3 and 4 in figure 4. The only difference between them is that project 3 has a lower probability of failure. With no financing risk both projects have a higher NPV if they raise only one unit of financing (on the left side of the graph the solid lines are higher than the corresponding dashed lines). However, as financing risk increases eventually Project 3 creates more value by raising two units of capital, but project 4 is always worth less if it raises an extra unit of capital. This is because it is more costly for project 4 to raise an extra x because it is more likely to fail, i.e., it is more valuable to take a wait-and-see approach even though this leaves the project exposed to more financing risk. Eventually, if financing risk gets high enough, project 4 will not raise even one x because it becomes NPV negative.
The most innovative sectors or places, will have firms where interim failure is high and a wait-and-see approach is important. These firms will be unable to raise significant upfront financing because too much value is destroyed in the loss of their real options. So in times when financing risk is low, more firms will be financed and the mix of financed firms should become more innovative.
Aggregating this effect up across all firms we would expect times of increased innovation to come from times of increased experimentation by investors. Thus, lower financing risk should lead to a more innovative group of new ventures being funded and therefore, to more innovation. In fact, using data on patent filings for venture capital backed firms, Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2012) find evidence that is consistent with this view. In a related test Li (2011) reports that financial constraints only negatively impact R&D intensive firms.
Our work suggest that this is because only experimental firms cannot be fully protected from the impact of financing risk.
B. Funding Levels and Financing Risk
We can see from figure 4 that as financing risk increases, some firms may be unable to get financing but others will actually raise more money. This results in a surprising prediction that matches anecdotal evidence: when financing risk is high, many experimental firms can no longer get financing but the few that do get funding actually get more funding.
When venture capital investing dried up in 2009 investors anecdotally told some firms that they would only invest if the firm took an extra large amount of money relative to their annual capital need to make sure they would not have to come back to the financial markets for an extended period. Thus, while many firms were finding it impossible to raise money others were being asked to take enough for multiple years.
So while less total money will enter a sector during 'bad' times, and fewer firms will get funded, the few firms that get funded will be well funded relative to their annual spending. 23
C. Firm Stage and Financing Risk
The above model can be redone with multiple hurdles or stages. For example a project might have to first prove it works (hurdle A) and then prove it can be mass produced in a low cost fashion (hurdle B We can imagine projects with more than two stages. Projects with stages A, B, C, D, etc, face more financing risk than a project with only one stage (holding other parameters constant) and has more chances to fail. Essentially projects with only one stage can be more certain they have the money they need when they start relative to a project with many hurdles to jump. This suggests that projects that require more money spent over longer time frames face greater financing risk.
D. Investor Mix and Financing Risk
Lower financing risk lowers the amount of capital firms need and should therefore also allow smaller investors with more limited capital to invest. Our model therefore suggests that the mix of investors should shift towards smaller and more early stage investors in good times. In bad times, a large investor might be able to give a firm more support and protect them from the financing shock but small investors don't have this option and must therefore stop investing. 25 Thus, in the low investing times small, so-called angel, investors should significantly reducing investing relative to larger investors, as the coordination costs to bring together enough of them is too high. So larger investors should more consistently invest across time.
E. 'Herd Behavior' in Innovative Investments
Conventional wisdom suggests that contrarian strategies might be good because following the crowd leads to a flood of capital in a sector and lowers returns. Our model implies that this is not true in every case. In our model, fully rational investors who only make NPV positive investments are optimally entering the market when prices are high (because the financing risk is low) and there is increased investing activity. When financing risk is low, it is optimal to give a firm less money and see how it does. Smaller investors who 25 In making this point we are implicitly assuming a coordination cost that prevents myriad little investors from simply joining to be a large investors.
face greater hurdles to forming large pools of money can find valuable investments in high real option companies that need only a little money but only during good times. Making this same investment when the probability of future funding is low is NPV negative. Thus for innovative projects with high real option value, it may actually make sense to invest with the crowd.
The corollary to this view also provides a more positive interpretation to the increase in capital that is associated with the initial diffusion of very radical new technologies, such as railways, motor cars, internet or clean energy technologies. Our model implies that such technologies may in fact need 'hot' financial markets, where financing risk is extremely low and many investors are in the market, to help with the initial diffusion of such technologies.
F. Stimulating Innovation
To the extent that the stock prices of innovative companies contain mispricing then investment will be misdirected and result in inefficiencies in the economy. This leads many economists and regulators to believe that popping bubbles would improve outcomes and therefore should be attempted. However, our work suggests caution. We show how increased capital flows can be completely rational and may actually be a necessary part of the creation and commercialization of new ideas. Thus, governments wishing to stimulate innovation may actually need to help create the coordination among investors that leads to high activity periods.
Our work suggests potential methods governments could use to help stimulate innovation. While one might expect governments to do a poor job of choosing which technology to back, our work shows that innovation can be stimulated through a focus on exits. Thus, tax incentives or financial support surrounding the purchase of new ventures should help innovation at its earliest stages. This effect should be larger than just a direct effect if it helps create the high funding equilibrium. Furthermore, incentives or money directed at the funding of later stage projects that are already shown to work will reduce financing risk and thus allow more early stage investment.
Our work also shows that encouraging innovation requires the stimulation of a simultaneous decision by many investors. Thus, concentrating incentives on a particular sector or geographic location could help investors coordinate. This suggests that diffuse or broad based incentives to innovate are likely to be less effective than incentives concentrated in a location, sector or toward a particular goal.
In general, our work suggests the need to convince investors future funding will be available. Thus, anything that can help create this perception could radically change the level of innovation in a place or point in time.
V. Conclusion
Startups have been associated with the initial diffusion of several technological revolutions (railway, semiconductors and computers, internet, motor cars, clean technology) and there is increasing evidence of the important role of startup firms in driving aggregate productivity growth in the economy (Foster, Haltiwanger and Syverson (2008) ). This paper builds on the emerging research examining the role of the capital markets in driving innovation in the real economy (Kortum and Lerner (2000) , Mollica and Zingales (2007) , Samila and Sorenson (2011) ) and provides a mechanism for why investors may increase experimentation during some periods. We depart from the view that financial market activity is purely a response to novel technologies and suggest instead that financial markets drive innovative activity.
We argue that a particular feature of innovative startups is that they don't know how much investment will be required to get to the 'finish line'. Intermediate results may be equivocal, or additional investments may be required to get to cash flow positive. Any investor in such startups with limited resources must therefore also rely on other investors to bring innovative firms to fruition.
Because of this, such startups face two risks -fundamental risk (that the project gets an investment but turns out not to be viable) and financing risk (that the project needs more money to proceed but cannot get the financing even if it is fundamentally sound). Financing risk is typically ignored in the literature because all firms with positive fundamental NPV are assumed to get funded. This ignores the fact that investing requires coordination across time between investors with limited resources. Investors must, therefore, forecast the probability that other investors will be there to fund the firm in the future. A low forecast in the probability of future funding reduces the NPV of the project and makes the decision not to invest rational. Thus, financing risk is part of a rational equilibrium.
The impact of financing risk on a firm can be reduced by giving the firm more funding.
However, this comes at a cost. A firm with more funding may spend some or all of the money even in the event of disappointing intermediate information. This cost is greater for highly experimental firms where the real option to shut down the firm is most valuable.
The more valuable the real option to shut down a firm, the less funding the firm should receive at a given time. Firms that receive less funding are more affected by a financing shock. Thus, early round investors investing in innovative firms face an important tradeoff between lowering financing risk and increasing real option value. The most innovative firms are thus most susceptible to financing risk as they are least able to acquire a 'war chest' to survive a down turn.
We show that financing risk is inherent to the funding of new ventures and demonstrate its impact. We argue that the most innovative firms, or those in the early period of a technology adoption, may need 'hot' financing environments to help with their initial financing or diffusion. This implies that a fundamentally different, more innovative type of project will be funded in 'hot' rather than 'cold' markets. By driving experimentation, financing risk may play a key role in creating and magnifying technological revolutions and the process of creative destruction. Some readers may feel that financing risk could be generated with a simpler modelafter all ignoring any effects from sale negotiations, couldn't a project turn NPV negative if early investors forecast no future investors will support it? Yes, however, such a belief would be irrational and in the future investors would rationally support it. Thus, this kind of model would NOT have equilibrium financing risk. However, our implications and results do hold in a world with irrational financing risk, but our model helps demonstrate that no irrationality is needed, which has important implications.
To demonstrate that a simpler model would not work consider the following model.
A project with NPV Π pays off V with probability p and with a probability (1 − p) it needs another x. Investing x buys the investor a fraction q. A rational investor will invest as long as the fraction q ≥ If investors forecast a No-Invest state then they will invest as long as x ≤ qpV . This is because the present value of the project is pV so they invest if their fraction q of the PV is greater than the cost, x.
If investors forecast an Invest state for one more period followed by the no invest state then the an investor who invests x for fraction q expects to receive qpV +(1−p)(1−q)qpV , that is, if it pays off in the first attempt (prob p) they get qV and if it pays off on the second attempt (prob (1 − p)p)they get a fraction q of what doesn't go to the second investor (1−q)V . Therefore, the first investors would invest as long as x ≤ qpV +(1−p)(1−q)qpV .
And if investors forecast infinite Invest states then the first investor would invest as long
It might then seem that as long as (1 − p)(1 − q)qpV > 0 that some parameters would result in a world where x ≥ qpV but x ≤ qpV + (1 − p)(1 − q)qpV so investors would invest only if they forecasted future investment, and thus there would be financing risk.
Or x ≥ qpV but x ≤ pV q 1−(1−p)(1−q) , which would again result in financing risk. However, this is not correct.
If x ≥ qpV the q endogenously increases until the first round investor invests (x ≤ q pV ) or q or hits 1. That is, firms that are about to fail because the cant get funding increase the fraction they are willing to give to get funded. Thus, the first period investor will only not invest in equilibrium if x ≥ pV . However, if this is true then x ≥ pV q 1−(1−p)(1−q) because q 1−(1−p)(1−q) ≤ 1 ∀ 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. Thus, if the first round investor will not invest in the No-Invest equilibrium then he wont invest in the Invest equilibrium, and vice versa. Therefore, there is no financing risk in this model -investors either always invest or never do. In order to get rational equilibrium financing risk the forecast of no financing tomorrow must fundamentally alter the outcome of the project in some way. This is what the model we present in this paper does. But it is only rational to forecast other VCs will not invest if Π I=0 < 0.
It is, of course, possible that for some parameters Π I=1 ≥ 0, while for others Π I=0 < 0.
However, for both equilibria to simultaneously hold for a project it must be that case that
The first inequality holds because (1 − γ f − γ s ), θ, and (1 − φ) are all probabilities and thus less than 1, while r > 0. Since the middle term is negative and V (1) > V (0) for the second inequality to hold it must be the case that γ s V (1)−x(1+r) > 0 and γ s V (0)−x(1+r) < 0.
Furthermore, given this is true then with large enough φ and θ the second inequality holds.
Thus, there are at least two possible symmetric pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria -the 'invest' equilibria in which each investor forecasts that the future VCs will invest or the 'no-invest' equilibria in which each investor forecasts that the future VCs will not invest.
A3. Proof of Proposition 2:
We begin by solving for the profit functions for any level of commitment. This can be done using an iterative expansion process or by simply multiplying each potential outcome by the probability it occurs. 
which is just the value of the project without financing risk, and thus clearly NPV positive. Therefore, there is some N < ∞ such that Π n=N I=0
> 0. So investors will make an investment of N x regardless of the signal I. So the project no longer is not longer impacted by financing risk.
A4. Proof of Proposition 3:
With complete contracts we know from Proposition 2 that the value of the project with commitment is equation (A4).
With incomplete contracts the profit functions with commitment for n = N ≥ 2 is 
Thus, the value of committing and extra x with incomplete contracts is less than with complete contracts. So incomplete contracts reduce the value of committing more money.
Furthermore, the derivative of equation (A6) with respect to γ f is negative. Therefore, the
